

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

**WHAT SHOULD THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD
BE IN THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

by

Daniel R. Hokanson

June 2000

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**WHAT SHOULD THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD BE IN THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF**

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Major, Oregon Army National Guard
B.S., United States Military Academy, 1986

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS**


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
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
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ABSTRACT

The Cold War has ended and the role of the National Guard has evolved from a strategic reserve force to an integral part of today's Total Force. The National Guard's representation in the joint environment however is still representative of its Cold War mission and could present risk if it is not updated to reflect the new roles and missions of the National Guard. The new roles and missions of the National Guard require it to operate seamlessly in the joint environment, a role that was traditionally covered by its active counterparts. This evolution in roles and missions requires the National Guard's role in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to increase to accurately represent and plan for Guard involvement in joint operations. This thesis reviews the new roles and missions of the National Guard, as identified in the Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, and the directorates within the Joint Staff that directly influence them. Specific areas within each directorate that influence National Guard integration are identified and then prioritized. The result is a recommendation of current and proposed positions within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in priority order due to anticipated resource constraints, that will best support seamless integration of the National Guard into joint operations. The thesis concludes with specific recommendations on the selection and management of National Guard personnel assigned to Joint Staff positions.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The world has changed drastically since the collapse of the Berlin Wall; yet National Guard involvement in joint decision making remains largely stuck in the past. The lack of National Guard representation in the joint environment creates potential risk in joint operations where National Guard forces are involved. This thesis reviews the current National Guard representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommends 30 positions as necessary to insure the Guard is better integrated into the joint environment. The recommendations are prioritized to account for potential resourcing issues when filling the positions.

During the Cold War, the National Guard did not require significant Joint Staff representation because the Guard's primary mission was to serve as a strategic reserve and joint decisionmaking played only a minor role in defense planning, budgeting and operational issues. Only with the enactment of the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* did the Joint Staff begin to emerge as a key contributor to defense policymaking. As a result, both the Guard's and the Joint Chief's of Staff roles have changed dramatically.

The National Guard now carries far greater responsibilities for National Defense than it did during the Cold War and must now operate seamlessly in the joint environment. *Joint Vision 2010* requires every component -- including the National Guard -- to be fully integrated into the joint environment as part of *Joint Vision 2010's* Full-Spectrum Force.

Joint institutions have made terrific progress in facilitating joint decisionmaking and coordination for the Active Component (AC), however; the National Guard remains a very limited partner in the process. Little growth has occurred in National Guard representation in the Joint Staff, even as National Guard roles and missions have expanded. Raw statistics make this under-representation evident. Today, the National

Guard makes up 21 percent of the U.S. military but is less than two percent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Yet, these raw statistics understate the degree to which the Reserve Component lacks adequate representation. What is important is not just the percentage of the forces in the Reserve Component (RC), but their new responsibilities for national defense. With overseas military operations proliferating and the armed services having shrunk by a third since the Cold War, the Pentagon has been forced to rely more heavily on the Guard and Reserves to conduct such operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere. That reliance is likely to persist. In addition to overseas requirements, the Guard is also fulfilling new roles and missions in the areas of Homeland Defense, Smaller Scale Contingencies, Shaping the International Environment and Major Theater Wars.

What is at risk if the National Guard continues to be excluded from key aspects of joint decisionmaking? The National Guard cannot operate seamlessly with the other components until it is fully integrated into the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Anything short of full integration in the joint arena could create unnecessary risk in joint operations involving National Guard forces. The unnecessary risk could develop from any aspect of National Guard employment where joint planning or joint decisions are made without a thorough understanding of the National Guard. This concern was emphasized by the *Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study* (RCE 2005) which said unfamiliarity within the AC with RC missions, capabilities, structures, and resource procedures hampers the ability of the Department of Defense to use the RC most effectively. The Guard needs adequate representation in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reduce potential risk in its new roles and missions.

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I. INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War, the requirements for National Guard representation in the Joint Chiefs of Staff have grown sharply. The National Guard has been assigned roles and missions far beyond those it played in the past. At the same time, the need for jointness in planning, resourcing and executing these missions has grown, particularly as the National Guard and the active component work together to strengthen Total Force Integration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provides the key arena for such joint decisionmaking. Yet, National Guard representation in the Joint Staff and other key JCS organizations has changed remarkably little since the Cold War, despite the dramatic shift in Guard responsibilities.

This thesis identifies specific shortfalls in National Guard representation in the Joint Staff and other Joint organizations, and recommends changes that would have the greatest potential payoff for improving decisionmaking in Guard-related missions. The thesis begins by analyzing the crucial role that jointness now plays in the national defense. Next, the thesis assesses the new roles and missions assigned to the National Guard, which increase the need for Guard representation in the Joint Staff and other joint institutions. The thesis then analyzes current National Guard representation in these joint institutions, and provides a prioritized set of recommendations to strengthen Guard participation in joint decisionmaking.

A. THE ISSUES AT STAKE

Considerable attention has focused recently on the question of whether to grant the Chief, NGB a full seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and promote the Chief to 4 star rank. This thesis focuses on a much less visible but extremely significant issue: the need to adjust National Guard representation in the Joint Staff to match recent shifts in Guard roles and missions.

During the Cold War, the National Guard did not require significant Joint Staff representation for two reasons. First, the primary mission for the Guard was to serve as a

strategic reserve, and that mission did not appear at the time to demand extensive Guard participation in joint decisionmaking. Second, for much of the Cold War, joint decisionmaking played only a minor role in defense planning, budgeting and operational issues. Only with the enactment of the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* did the Joint Staff begin to emerge as a key contributor to defense policymaking. Prior to that legislation, the Guard could safely ignore the Joint Staff because it was little more than a rubber stamp for decisions already made by the services.

Both factors have now changed dramatically. The National Guard carries far greater responsibilities for National Defense than it did during the Cold War. As noted in *The 1998 Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and Congress*, "today, Reserve Component forces are fully integrated into all war plans, and no major military operation can be successful without their participation."¹ This participation requires every component -- including the National Guard -- to be fully integrated into the joint environment as part of *Joint Vision 2010's* Full-Spectrum Force. In *Joint Vision 2010*, General Shalikashvily states, "to achieve this integration while conducting military operations we must be fully joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically."²

Joint institutions have made terrific progress in facilitating joint decisionmaking and coordination for the Active Component (AC). In important respects, however, the National Guard remains a very limited partner in that process. In conducting the research for this thesis, I was struck by how little growth has occurred in National Guard representation in the Joint Staff, even as National Guard roles and missions have expanded. Raw statistics make this under-representation evident. Today, 38 percent of

¹ Cohen, William S. *The Annual Report to the President and Congress* (1998): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/chap9.html>. [25 January 00].

² Shalikashvily, John M. *Joint Vision 2010*. Washington, D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997.

U.S. military forces come from the Reserve Component, yet its representation on the JCS is only six percent. The National Guard alone makes up 21 percent of the U.S. military but is less than two percent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Yet, these raw statistics understate the degree to which the Reserve Component lacks adequate representation. What is important is not just the percentage of the forces in the Reserve Component (RC), but their new responsibilities for national defense. With overseas military operations proliferating and the armed services having shrunk by a third since the Cold War, the Pentagon has been forced to rely more heavily on the Guard and Reserves to conduct such operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere. That reliance is likely to persist. A recent Pentagon study predicted the demand for Guard and Reserve deployments to remain high over the next 15 to 20 years.³ In addition to overseas requirements, the Guard is also fulfilling new roles in the area of Homeland Defense. The creation of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Teams, the Consequence Management (CM) mission, and potential fielding of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system are just a few of the growing number of missions with which the Guard is being tasked.

The National Guard is also deeply involved in the area of Strategic Shaping. Programs such as the State Partnership for Peace (SPP) Program, International Disaster Relief, and ongoing Peacekeeping Operations all contribute directly to strategic shaping. All of these new mission areas require JCS coordination to ensure they are fully integrated into and support the National Military Strategy. In short, the world has changed drastically since the collapse of the Berlin Wall; yet National Guard involvement in joint decision making remains largely stuck in the past.

Who cares? What is at risk if the National Guard continues to be excluded from key aspects of joint decisionmaking? The National Guard cannot operate seamlessly with

³ Myers, Steven L. "Reservist New Role Transforms the Military." The New York Times (24 January 2000): Available [Online]: <www.nytimes.com>. [25 January 2000].

the other components until it is fully integrated into the JCS. Anything short of full integration in the joint arena could create unnecessary risk in joint operations involving National Guard forces. The unnecessary risk could develop from any aspect of National Guard employment where joint planning or joint decisions are made without a thorough understanding of the National Guard. This concern was emphasized by the *Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study* (RCE 2005) which said that “unfamiliarity within the AC with RC missions, capabilities, structures, and resource procedures hampers the ability of the Department (Department of Defense) to use the RC most effectively.”⁴ The Guard needs adequate representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reduce potential risk in the new roles and missions of Homeland Defense, Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs), Shaping the International Environment and Major Theater Wars (MTWs), by ensuring its forces are fully integrated into joint operations.

In the roles and missions associated with Homeland Defense, potential risk can arise from a number of factors. First, in the event of a disaster or consequence within a state, the National Guard needs to be integrated into all JCS planning as the most likely first responder. Second, the National Guard has fielded Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Teams throughout the U.S., which are trained in WMD and Consequence Management (CM). These teams need to be incorporated into JCS planning to utilize and leverage their specialized training. Finally, all Homeland Defense missions will require coordination between the services and other government and non-government agencies. The current lack of Guard joint integration in these areas was evident in the planning portion of the Dynamic Commitment exercise, which is part of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In the vignettes for this QDR resourcing exercise the role of the Guard was minimal, yet in reality it would play a major role in many of the vignettes.

⁴ Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study (2 August 1999): Available [Online]: <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005_072299.html>. [28 January 2000].

In the area of Smaller Scale Contingencies, potential risk could arise from not fully integrating the Guard into SSC planning. One recommendation from RCE 2005 envisions the Guard providing a brigade size Task Force in a Bosnia type scenario. In such a scenario, the Guard must be fully integrated into the development of the brigade task force to meet the scenario requirements. The Guard must be trained and ready to deploy as a mission ready brigade task force to meet the regional Commander in Chief's (CINCs) requirements. The Guard currently lacks any representation in the Joint Warfighting Analysis Division of the J-8, which is responsible to integrate the RC into MTWs and SSCs.

In the arena of Shaping the International Environment, potential risk could arise from the JCS not fully incorporating the actions of the National Guard under its State Partnership for Peace (SPP) Program. The Guard is actively participating in its SPP Program and developing a working relationship with the states involved in the program. The associations and working relationships could be leveraged by the JCS by integrating the states involved with any operations involving the foreign state they are partnered with. A lack of integrating the Guard would confuse foreign states with established ties to a state National Guard unit. The Guard currently lacks any representation in the J-5, the Directorate responsible for Strategic Plans and Policy.

The roles and missions associated with Major Theater War's present potential risk because the JCS and CINCs have yet to mission all the National Guard Divisions. The current AC forces face increased requirements from SSCs, peacekeeping operations, and other requirements, all of which have stretched the AC forces thin. In the event of a second MTW, the smaller AC forces will need the Guard to be successful. The Guard must be integrated into the plans for potential scenarios now to reduce the risk involved in crisis planning when time is short. The J-3 and J-7 Directorates are largely responsible for these areas and the recommended positions in each Directorate will greatly reduce the current risk.

Potential risk can also be found in resourcing, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff play a crucial role in allocating resources for the U.S. military. In order to successfully execute

their new roles and missions the Guard must have the necessary funding. In the past, because the National Guard had so little representation in DOD decisionmaking on budget issues, the Guard often had to rely on Congressional intervention in order to secure essential funding. The intervention of Congress in defense budgeting creates the impression of interservice squabbling and an inability to resolve issues without congressional oversight. It would be far preferable to strengthen the representation of the National Guard in joint decisionmaking within DOD, so that resourcing issues can be resolved at that level. Internal resolution of resourcing will also be a significant step for Active Component/Reserve Component (AC/RC) integration.

B. THESIS METHODOLOGY

This thesis uses Department of Defense (DOD) documents to identify the future roles and missions of the National Guard. Specific documents include the *Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study* (RCE 2005), the *National Security Strategy* (NSS), the *National Military Strategy* (NMS), the *Defense Planning Guidance* (DPG), and various joint documents to include manning documents and individual duty descriptions of Joint Staff members. Dozens of interviews were also conducted with members of the National Guard Bureau, the Army and Air National Guard, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff Directorates, and key staff members involved with the *Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986*. This thesis could never have been written without the invaluable information I gained from these interviews. However, the arguments and conclusions in this thesis are my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the officers and civilians interviewed.

Chapter II reviews the rise of jointness and analyzes its growing significance for defense policymaking. The chapter also reviews the composition of the JCS, focusing specifically on the Joint Staff. Chapter III uses the *Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study* and the *National Security Strategy* to examine the emerging roles and missions of the National Guard, and analyzes the requirements of these missions for joint decisionmaking. These roles and missions include Homeland Defense and Information

Operations, Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs), Shaping the International Environment, and Major Theater Wars (MTWs).

Chapter IV reviews the current National Guard representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and examines the issues surrounding that representation on the OCJCS, JCS Boards, Councils and Committees, and the Joint Staff. Each issue area is discussed to highlight its importance and is tied to specific recommendations to improve the inadequacies identified in the existing arrangement. Chapter V addresses the practical challenges of implementing these recommendations.

C. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Although there are a lot of recommendations on where the National Guard should place its officers, there is not only a limit on the resources available to this, but also a limit on officers qualified to fill the jobs. Because of these limitations, I have prioritized my recommendations so they can be used in an incremental process for fielding National Guard officers on the Joint Staff. The entire list of recommendations is found in Chapter V, Figure 5-1. The following are the top ten recommendations of this thesis.

The first recommendation and highest priority is the existing Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Guard Matters (ACJCS/NG) position. This position is authorized and is currently filled. This position is in the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS) and is the highest ranking and most influential position the Guard has on the JCS. The ability of the ACJCS/NG to access the JCS leadership is critical to gaining support for the new roles and missions of the National Guard. The concern with this position is it lacks any real authority. The recommendation is to fill this position first, but increase the responsibilities and role of the position on the JCS Boards, Councils and Committees.

The second recommendation is the Executive Officer to the ACJCS/NG. This position is authorized and is currently filled. This position is in the OCJCS and is responsible to coordinate the staff actions and schedules for the ACJCS/NG. The reason this position is ranked second is it is critical to the effectiveness of the ACJCS/NG and if

there were only two Guard personnel on the JCS, this position would be critical to the effectiveness of the ACJCS/NG. The recommendation is to fill this position second.

The third recommendation is in the Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division in the J-7. This position is authorized and is currently filled. This position is responsible for integrating the RC into the J-7, which directly affects the new roles and missions of the National Guard. The current representation in this area is very important because it is the "deep fight" for the Guard. The J-7 is responsible for integrating the Guard into joint exercises and training, conventional war plans, joint assessment and analysis and joint doctrine which is key to joint interoperability. The recommendation is to fill this position third with the most senior Guard member on the JCS.

The fourth recommendation is in the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) branch of the J-3. This is a new, recommended position. This position is responsible for integrating the National Guard into the JFCOM branch of the J-3. There is currently no representation for the National Guard in the JFCOM branch. The problem is JFCOM is assuming the role of Domestic Disaster Response and Consequence Management, an area the Guard has traditionally played a major role in as the state's first responder in such events. The recommendation is to fill this position fourth by re-assigning the current National Guard position in the Joint History Office to this position and filling it with an O-6 (ARNG or ANG).

The fifth and sixth recommendations are in the Conventional War Plans Division of the J-7. These positions are authorized and are currently filled. These positions are responsible for the Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs), planning for a second Major Theater War (MTW), and insuring the new roles and missions of the Guard are incorporated into Annexes A (where the CINC addresses the RC) and T (the inter-agency political and military planning annex) of the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES). These positions are critical to reducing the risk of not incorporating the Guard and its Divisions into the operational planning for potential scenarios. The recommendation is to fill these positions fifth and sixth.

The seventh recommendation is in the Joint Vision and Doctrine Division of the J-7. This is a new, recommended position. This position will be responsible for National Guard integration into Doctrine Network Education and Training (DOCNET), the Joint Doctrine Operational Lab (JDOL), and Advanced Distributive Learning (ADL). These programs are part of the distributive training programs that will be utilized by all services for joint education. Guard representation here is critical to insure it has access to each of the programs in the future. The recommendation is to fill this position seventh by assigning an O-5 (ARNG or ANG) to the position.

The eighth recommendation is in the Joint Requirements Division of the J-8. This is an authorized and currently filled position. This position is responsible to integrate and represent the National Guard in force structure and resource analysis. This position is critical because it recommends near-, mid- and long-term force structure to support national security objectives, policy and strategy. The recommendation is to fill this position eighth, but increase the position's responsibilities and access to the J-8 leadership.

The ninth recommendation is in the Information Operations Division of the J-3. This is an authorized but currently vacant position. This position is responsible for providing Information Operations (IO), and Special Technical Operations (STO) support to the JCS, SecDef and CINCs. This position is important because it provides the Guard with an active liaison in the development of joint policy, strategy and doctrine concerning Information Operations and Information Warfare (IO/IW). The recommendation is to fill this position ninth and assign an O-4 (ARNG or ANG) to this authorized position.

The tenth recommendation is in the Strategy Division of the J-5. This is a new, recommended position. This position is responsible for integrating the Guard into the NSS, NMS, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Joint Planning Document (JPD) and TEPs. This position is critical to the National Guard because the National Guard currently has no representation in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate. The recommendation is to fill this position tenth and by assigning an O-5 (ARNG) to the J-5 Strategy Division.

This thesis recommends and prioritizes a total of 30 positions on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The other positions (numbers 11 through 30) can be found in Chapter V, Figure 5-1. In addition to recommending and prioritizing the positions on the JCS, this thesis would be remiss by not highlighting the importance of finding the right individuals to fill the recommended positions.

The Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau should control the National Guard positions on the Joint Staff, as well as the selection of officers to fill them. This is important for three reasons. First, representatives must be knowledgeable of how the National Guard works, the capabilities it has, and the roles and missions it performs. Second, representatives selected to fill the positions must be exceptional because they will be working with the Active Component's future leaders and they will form their opinion of the National Guard based upon this initial experience. Third, the National Guard will gain a cadre of officers with joint staff experience that will help it seamlessly integrate the Guard into the joint environment and the Total Force.

II. THE RISE OF JOINT DECISION MAKING INSTITUTIONS

Joint decisionmaking has been slow to take root in the United States, but now plays a decisive role in shaping the National Defense. The first attempt by the U.S. to establish a formal organization for joint operations occurred in 1903 with the establishment of the Joint Board. The Joint Board was composed of the heads of the Army and Navy and the chief planner of each service. The Joint Board was intended to plan for joint operations, but its charter gave it no actual authority. As a result, the Joint Board had little or no impact on the conduct of the First World War. In 1919 the Service secretaries tried to reestablish and revitalize the Joint Board, but it was given no more legal authority than it had in 1903. With the exception of its 1935 publication of *Joint Action of the Army and Navy*, which gave some guidance for the joint operations in World War II, the Board was not influential in the war.⁵

In 1942, in response to the need for coordinated staff work, a concept described by Admiral Leahy as a "unified high command" was adopted. The group came to be known as the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Under President Roosevelt's leadership, the JCS grew in influence and became the primary agent in coordinating and giving strategic direction to the Army and Navy.⁶

After the war, President Truman and officials in the War Department argued that shifts in the security environment required an end to service autonomy. Truman noted that one of the clearest lessons of World War II was the need for a unified direction of U.S. land, sea and air forces. The rapid changes in warfare and technology were making the "Armed Services much more dependent upon each other than ever before," hence the

⁵ "History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: www.dtic.mil/jccs/core/history_js.html. [6 October 1999].

⁶ "History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: www.dtic.mil/jccs/core/history_js.html. [6 October 1999].

need for unified command “is sure to be greater if there is any future aggression against world peace.”⁷ The National Security Act of 1947 formally established the JCS and began a series of legislative and executive changes that produced today’s defense organization.

The most important change was initiated by the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*.⁸ The intent of Goldwater-Nichols was to reorganize the Department of Defense (DOD), strengthen civilian authority in the DOD and improve the military advice provided to the President, National Security Council (NSC) and the Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the Act placed clearer responsibility and authority on the CINCs and increased attention to formulating strategy and contingency planning. The Act also sought to reduce service parochialism by clearly placing the Joint Chiefs of Staff above the individual services.⁹

A. JCS STRUCTURE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff is composed of the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and the Chiefs of the four services. Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accomplishing his responsibilities for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces; their operation under unified command; and for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces. The Joint Staff is composed of approximately equal numbers of officers from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, and Air Force. In practice, the Marines make up about 20 percent of the number allocated to the Navy.¹⁰ The Joint Staff is authorized 806

⁷ “Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.” Congressional Record (7 May 1986), S 5471.

⁸ “History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jccs/core/history_js.html>. [6 October 1999].

⁹ “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Should the General Staff Debate be Over.” (April 1997): Available [Online]: www.au.af.mil/au/database/projects/ay1997/97-132.pdf. [5 April 2000].

¹⁰ “The Joint Staff.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff Home Page (10 December 1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/jcs_defn.html>. [6 October 1999].

officers, 281 enlisted personnel and 208 civilians.¹¹ The organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is depicted in Figure 2-1. In each directorate there are two numbers in parenthesis, the first number is the number of assigned AC personnel in the directorate, the second number is the number of assigned National Guard personnel in the directorate.

The Joint Staff has no executive authority over combatant forces, and, by law, its direction rests exclusively with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the Chairman directs, the Joint Staff may also assist the other JCS members in carrying out their responsibilities.¹² The Joint Chiefs of Staff also play a key role in the boards, councils and committees that directly influence the direction of effort and allocation of resources, such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

B. SUMMARY

The Joint Chiefs of Staff is the premier joint decision making organization in the United States. The JCS was created to ensure coordination between the military services and is responsible for the unified strategic direction of the combatant forces; their operation under unified command; and their integration into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces. The responsibilities of the JCS, and the new role and missions of the Guard, make it critically important the National Guard is an integral part of the JCS decision making process.

¹¹ "The Joint Staff Military and Civilian Strength Report." Staff Management Branch (J-1), Joint Chiefs of Staff. 31 December 1999.

¹² Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (2 August 1999): Available [Online]: <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005_072299.html>. [28 January 2000].




Figure 2-1. Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Active Component/National Guard)

III. THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RCE 2005

With the end of the Cold War, the role of the Reserve Components began a quiet evolution. The National Guard's Cold War mission of containing and/or defeating the Soviet Union and its allies evolved as it began to comprise a greater percentage of the Total Force. In the past, joint operations were important, but not critical to the National Guard's missions. Today however, joint operations are an integral part of all operations and are critical to achieving the Full Spectrum Dominance discussed in *Joint Vision 2010*. The National Guard is no longer a strategic reserve force, but an essential partner in military operations from Smaller Scale Contingencies (SSCs) to Major Theater Wars (MTWs).¹³ Although this evolution has changed the roles and missions of the National Guard, its representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff still reflects its Cold War mission.

The FY2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) required a study of alternative concepts for employing Reserve Component (RC) forces. The result was the *Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study* (RCE-2005) conducted by an integrated team of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Joint Staff, Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) members. The study was conducted to define potential RC roles and missions. The potential roles and missions identified were consolidated into the following three categories: Homeland Defense alternatives plus Information Operations (IO), Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC) alternatives, and Major Theater War (MTW) alternatives plus Strategic Reserve.¹⁴ Another future role not identified in RCE2005, but identified in the President's National Security Strategy, is Shaping the International Environment.

¹³ Cohen, William S. The Annual Report to the President and Congress (1998): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/chap9.html>. [25 January 00].

¹⁴ Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-1.

A. POST COLD-WAR ROLES AND MISSIONS

1. Homeland Defense

This alternative contains five elements. The first is using the National Guard for the emerging National Missile Defense (NMD) mission. The Guard is marked for this mission but the time frame for implementation is unknown pending the development of an effective missile system and the decision to employ it. The second is to activate a RC Continental United States (CONUS) Joint Task Force (JTF) for Homeland Defense missions (with 30% AC augmentation). The third is to establish a 400-man joint integrated RC virtual unit for Information Operations/Information Assurance (IO/IA) and related mission support. In this case the RC could provide stability and expertise not normally associated with the AC. The fourth is to “Dual Mission” selected RC units for WMD Consequence Management (CM) and Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) missions. The fifth is to increase by twenty-five percent RC units/individuals rotating through Joint Task Forces (JTFs) for drug, border defense, and immigration missions.¹⁵

The Homeland Defense missions identified in RCE2005 and the ones the Guard is currently involved in require joint coordination and representation. The missions involve coordination within the military services, and also inter-agency coordination. As an example, WMD teams must coordinate with the other services as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and state, local and municipal law enforcement and emergency management agencies.

2. Smaller Scale Contingencies

This alternative contains five elements of which the first two hold the most promise for implementation. The first is to tailor timeline restrictions established by the theater CINCs. This refers to reducing the minimum assignment period for RC units before they can be used in operations. The second is the RC provides every other rotation

¹⁵ Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-1.

of follow-on interpositional peacekeeping mission requirements. The third is the RC assumes one full, continuous, rotational follow-on Peacekeeping Accord implementation. The third element envisions a brigade sized task force in a Bosnia-type scenario. The fourth is to meet initial (first 60 days) SSC requirements with AC assets then follow with RC participation. The fifth is expanded RC use in meeting High Demand/Low Density (HD/LD) requirements. The issue in the fifth element is the division of labor between AC and RC forces is not well balanced.¹⁶

The requirement for joint planning and joint representation is implicit in SSCs. The National Guard is currently involved in Smaller Scale Contingencies in Kosovo and Bosnia, and for the first time an ARNG Division (the 49th Division, Texas ARNG) is in command of AC units in Bosnia. The importance of the decision to place AC forces under command of a RC Division is unprecedented in recent history and further highlights the need for National Guard units to be fully represented and integrated in the joint planning arena.

3. Shaping the International Environment

The Department of Defense has an essential role to play in shaping the International Security Environment. DOD efforts help promote regional stability, prevent or reduce conflicts and threats, and deter aggression and coercion on a day to day basis. To accomplish this mission, the Department employs a wide variety of means, including forces permanently stationed abroad; forces rotationally deployed overseas; forces deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military to military interactions; and programs such as defense cooperation, security assistance, and international arms cooperation.¹⁷

¹⁶ Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-5.

¹⁷ Cohen, William S. Annual Report to the President and Congress (1998): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/chap9.html>. [25 January 2000]: p5.

In support of the DOD role in Shaping the International Environment, the National Guard is involved in the State Partnership for Peace (SPP) Program, International Disaster Relief, and Peacekeeping Operations. The National Guard also trains officers specifically for the shaping mission through the joint Center for Civil-Military Relations and Naval Postgraduate School Masters Degree program in International Security and Civil-Military Relations. All of these programs aid in strategic shaping by creating and fostering relationships with the military forces of the participating countries.

Joint planning and representation is critical in the strategic shaping environment. The actions of the National Guard must be seamlessly integrated into the entire strategic shaping process to insure its efforts support and complement the intent of the National Security Strategy.

4. Major Theater Wars

This category contains four potential RC roles and missions. The first is to increase RC participation in logistics/transportation management by twenty-five percent. This would help the AC by eliminating current shortfalls in AC Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) and may reduce the TEMPO stress and enhance AC/RC integration. Although converting some ARNG forces will alleviate some CS/CSS stress; it would also reduce the ratio of combat arms units to CS/CSS in the National Guard. The concern to the RC is this shift could change ARNG roles and missions and lead to restructuring that would reduce ARNG combat spaces, missions, and force structure.¹⁸

The second potential area is enhancing the role of ARNG enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs) in MTWs. This enhancement could occur in two separate ways. First, developing a strategy to make ARNG units available earlier in the event of an MTW, and

¹⁸ Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-2.

second, establish Round-Up relationships between eSBs and AC Divisions. Under the first, better AC/RC postmobilization training should improve availability times. Under the second, if establishment of Round-Up relationships between some eSBs and AC Divisions demonstrates training and employment compatibility, it may lead to a Round-Out configuration. This would guarantee ARNG units an enhanced MTW role.¹⁹

The third area is examining roles for ARNG combat divisions in MTWs (to include post-conflict stage). Three assessment methods can be used to examine this area. The first is annual and postmobilization training events can be examined and compared to deployment requirements. The second is to place four ARNG Divisions into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) apportionment tables as available forces. The third is to establish a capabilities-based Strategic Reserve for use in meeting more demanding or unanticipated events.²⁰

The fourth area is to convert an additional ten percent of Echelon Above Division (EAD) CS/CSS requirements to RC for the first MTW, to include up to a fifty percent RC role in Reception, Staging, Onward-movement, and Integration (RSOI). This would help fix current CS/CSS shortfalls, but as noted earlier, may reduce ARNG force structure as a result. This area also assumed that single units would provide the unit personnel, which would save \$1 million per year.²¹

National Guard involvement in joint decision making is critical for seamless integration into MTW planning. National Guard forces must be fully integrated in to joint planning and training to insure Guard Divisions and enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs) are missioned in support of the National Military Strategy.

¹⁹ Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-3.

²⁰ Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-4.

²¹ Booz, Allen and Hamilton. Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study, RCE-05 Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Booz, Allen and Hamilton Inc., 1999: B-4/5.

B. SUMMARY

The emerging roles and missions of the National Guard make it an integral part of the Full Spectrum Force described in *Joint Vision 2010*. The four main categories of Homeland Defense, Smaller Scale Contingencies, Shaping and MTW all require the National Guard to be fully integrated into the joint environment. In the past the National Guard could rely on its Active Duty counterparts to coordinate and plan its limited joint operations. Now however, the Guard must be proactive in every aspect of joint operations to insure it fulfills its role as an integral part of the Total Force.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff are authorized 1014 military personnel. Within the 1014 military authorizations, the Reserve Component (RC) has 62 full-time positions.²² The RC authorizations are further divided between the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve, Army National Guard and Air Force National Guard. Of the 62 RC authorizations, 20 are authorized for the National Guard and 16 are currently filled.

In sharp contrast to their role on the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the National Guard's role in the Total Force. The Total Force (Active/Guard/Reserve) is 2,246,362; of that number, 38 percent, or 864,144 are in the RC.²³ Within the RC, the National Guard is 476,000, or 55 percent.²⁴ The defining statistic is the National Guard is 21 percent of the Total Force, but is less than two percent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although this statistic reflects small National Guard representation on the JCS, it is specific positions, not numbers that will most benefit National Guard joint integration.

In principle, joint integration of the National Guard will require appropriate and effective representation in the OCJCS; JCS Boards, Councils and Committees; and the Joint Staff. In each of these three sub-elements of the JCS there are specific "issue areas" that have a direct influence on joint integration of the National Guard. The goal of this analysis is to identify the issue areas where the lack of Guard representation could be detrimental to the Total Force. The issue areas highlight where a National Guard

²² "The Joint Staff Military and Civilian Strength Report." Staff Management Branch (J-1), Joint Chiefs of Staff. 31 December 1999.

²³ FY2001 President's Budget Future Year Defense Program, ODUSD (PI0(RQ), May 12, 2000.

²⁴ "The National Guard in a Nutshell." The National Guard Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.ngb.dtic.mil/aboutng/body.htm>. [11 January 2000].

presence would help alleviate potential risk created by JCS unfamiliarity with the National Guard and other problems.

A. IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUE AREAS

1. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS)

The OCJCS is lead by the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) who is a four star general or flag officer, and is authorized 39 officers, 27 enlisted personnel and 24 civilians. Currently there are five National Guard personnel assigned to the OCJCS, the Assistant to the Chairman for National Guard Matters (ACJCS/NG, an Army National Guard (ARNG) two star general), an Executive Officer (an Air National Guard (ANG) O4), a Force Advisor (an ARNG O6), a JRB/JWCA Action Officer (an ARNG O5), and a Strategic Planner (an ARNG O5). The issue areas for the National Guard in the OCJCS are the ACJCS/NG, the Legislative Assistant Office, and the Public Affairs Office.

a. Assistant to the CJCS for National Guard Matters (ACJCS/NG)

The position of ACJCS/NG was the result of a compromise in 1997 when Senate Legislation was introduced to promote the Chief, NGB, to a full seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The legislation behind the initial move came from Senator Stevens (R-Alaska) in response to the Army Staff's treatment of the Guard during the Pentagon's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and a 1998 budget that shorted the Guard by \$743 million. The Senate added the JCS provision to the defense authorization bill with 49 co-sponsors. The bill however did not have equal House support and an interim proposal was introduced to promote the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB), to four stars and place him on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The final compromise was the appointment of two, two-star general officer positions on the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. One position is the ACJCS/NG, and the other is the assistant to the Chairman for Reserve Matters (ACJCS/RM, filled by a Reserve two-star general).²⁵

The position description of the ACJCS/NG as stated in the *FY00 Annual Report to Congress* is: "Serve as Personal Staff Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Advises the Chairman on all matters within his purview affecting the Army and Air National Guard. Acts as the Chairman's personal liaison with the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) and state governors, participates in Defense forums such as the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) and the Joint Review Board (JRB). Advises the Chairman on the utilization of the Guard in emerging missions and CINC war plans. As directed, represents the Chairman to members of Congress and staffers."²⁶

The duty description for the ACJCS/NG lacks any real authority in the joint environment and could be covered by the Vice-Chief, National Guard Bureau (VCNGB) or CNGB. The ACJCS/RM could is not a member of the JROC or Defense Resource Board (DRB), nor does the position afford the Guard much greater leverage on the Joint Staff that it had before. The ACJCS/NG is still subordinate to nine general officers on the joint staff and is a peer with an additional six. The issue of rank comes down to one of "equal in component". The ACJCS/NG could be argued to be "equal in component" to an AC three or four star general, but retains only the authority and influence of a two star general. The issue of "equal in component" could be resolved without increasing the rank of the ACJCS/NG by allowing the position direct representation on the JCS Boards, Councils and Committees.

The specific issue area is the National Guard is forced to operate from a subordinate position on the JCS and its boards, councils and committees. The JCS has a total of 18 officers in the rank of two-star or higher. If the current representation does not

²⁵ "Cohen Establishes New General Officer Positions." Newsstand (9 January 1998): Available [Online]: <www.ngaus.org/starestablish.html>. [21 April 1999].

²⁶ Duty Description for Assistant to the CJCS for National Guard Matters. JS Form 148. DEC 1999.

improve, the National Guard will continue to fight for resources and joint integration from a subordinate position.

ACJCS/NG Recommendation. Recommend the ACJCS/NG remain a two-star billet, but be given increased representation and authority on the JCS Boards, Councils and Committees such as the JROC, Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board and the Military Communication-Electronic Board (MCEB).

b. Legislative Assistant Office

The legislative process in its simplest terms is “selling” the importance of military resourcing to those who write the checks. The new roles and missions of the National Guard require a larger role in joint operations and therefore increased resources from Congress. If the National Guard is to be successful in its new roles and missions, it must have legislative support in the arena where joint decision making and planning will occur. The National Guard currently has its own legislative liaison office, but having representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not only help the JCS, it would show Congress the depth and willingness of AC/RC integration.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff stand to gain significantly from National Guard involvement in the JCS legislative office. The Guard is involved in every state and territory in the U.S., and therefore every member of Congress has a vested interest in the National Guard. Additionally, as a member of their Governor’s staff, state Adjutant Generals have the ability to present important legislative issues to their Governors. The Guard’s political support can be a great asset to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and all services if used correctly.

Legislative Assistance Office Recommendation. Recommend creating a new National Guard position and assigning an O-5 (ARNG or ANG) in the Legislative Assistant Office to represent the National Guard’s involvement in the joint environment and in the JCS.

c. Public Affairs Office

The members of the Army and Air National Guard involved in joint operations require and deserve public affairs representation that reflects their unique

characteristics. National Guard units are an integral part of their communities and public affairs is important in providing a link back to their families and community. As the National Guard plays a larger role in joint operations and its units deploy away from their communities, they will need public affairs representation to keep the close tie with their communities. This representation will have a great effect on morale for not only the soldiers, but also their families, their community, their employers and future recruiting efforts in the community. Public Affairs representation for the Guard is no more important than that afforded the active component, but like the active component, it is best represented by one of its own.

Public Affairs Office Recommendation. Recommend creating a new National Guard position and assigning an E-8 (ARNG or ANG non-commissioned officer) to represent and cover RC participation in JCS exercises and deployments.

2. JCS Boards, Councils and Committees

The JCS Boards, Councils, and Committees include the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), the Joint Material Priorities and Allocation Board and the Military Communication-Electronics Board (MCEB). The issue area for the National Guard in the JCS Boards, Councils and Committees is the JROC.

a. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)

The JROC is required by Section 181(b) of Title 10 to assist the CJCS by identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements (including existing systems and equipment) to meet the National Military Strategy (NMS); considering alternatives to any acquisition program that has been identified to meet military requirements by evaluating the cost, schedule, and performance criteria of the program and of identified alternatives; assigning joint priority among existing and future programs meeting valid requirements, and ensuring that the assignment of such priorities conforms

to and reflects resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) through the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).²⁷

The responsibilities of the JROC are associated not only with the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), but also support the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS); the Requirements Generation System (RGS); and the Acquisition Management System (AMS). The JROC, using the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, supports the JSPS by assisting the CJCS in providing programming assessment and advice to the SecDef. This advice is documented in the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) and the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). These documents weigh heavily in the programming and budgeting decisions made by the SecDef in the PPBS. Since all of this JROC energy is focused on requirements and capabilities, it is logical that the JROC also has oversight responsibility of the RGS.²⁸

The JROC is the validation and approval authority for Mission Need Statements (MNSs) as they work their way through the RGS. The JROC only reviews MNSs that may become expensive or are otherwise significant programs. Upon approval, the JROC forwards the MNSs to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) for consideration. The JROC may also address non-major programs to resolve contentious and high-interest issues such as: designation of the lead Service or agency, requirements disconnects, or to review programs at the request of the SecDef or the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition and Technology.²⁹

²⁷ Resource Allocation Volume I, The Formal Process. The Naval War College: Available [Online]: <www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdm/nsdmrav1.htm>. [25 January 2000].

²⁸ Resource Allocation Volume I, The Formal Process. The Naval War College: Available [Online]: <www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdm/nsdmrav1.htm>. [25 January 2000]: 4-10.

²⁹ Resource Allocation Volume I, The Formal Process. The Naval War College: Available [Online]: <www.nwc.navy.mil/nsdm/nsdmrav1.htm>. [25 January 2000]: 4-10.

The JROC is not officially a part of any of the strategic foundation decision-making systems; however, it is closely tied to and supports all of them. The JROC is considered the glue that bonds the systems together.³⁰ The JROC, which is a council of the JCS, is chaired by the VCJCS and its members include a four star representative from each of the services.

The JROC is one of the most influential councils on the JCS and is fundamental in the resourcing process. The JROC provides programming assessment and advice to the SecDef, is the validation and approval authority for Mission Need Statements (MNSs), and resolves contentious and high interest issues. The National Guard currently lacks direct representation to present or defend its resource concerns on the JROC. In the past, the Guard has suffered as a result. Integration of the Guard into the joint environment requires integration into the JROC as well.

JROC Recommendation. Recommend creating a National Guard position on the JROC for the CNGB to directly represent Guard resourcing issues.

3. The Joint Staff

The Joint Staff includes the primary directorates (J-1 through J-8) and the Directorate of Management (DOM). The following is a discussion of each of the staff directorates and the issue areas for the National Guard in each directorate.

a. J-1

The J-1 is the Directorate for Manpower and Personnel. The responsibilities of the J-1 are to manage manpower, formulate personnel policies, and supervise administration of personnel, including civilians and prisoners of war.³¹ The goals of the J-1 include enhancing total force readiness through the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) and Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) process,

³⁰ "Joint Exercise and Training Division." The Joint staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/jetd.htm>. [24 January 2000].

³¹ "Functions of Joint Staff Divisions." The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1997: Available [Online]:

optimizing the Joint Staff organization to support the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) and the JCS, and provide highly qualified manpower and personnel support to the staff and other agencies.

The J-1 is lead by a one star general or flag officer and is authorized 22 officers, 12 enlisted personnel and 17 civilians. Although there are responsibilities within the J-1 that are of significance to the National Guard, the functions of the J-1 are primarily component neutral. Additionally, J-1 personnel have been trained in National Guard specific J-1 responsibilities. The current United States Army Reserve (USAR) RC Advisor (O5) in the J-1 adequately represents National Guard concerns. There are no issue areas for the National Guard in the J-1.

J-1 Recommendation. No recommended changes to the J-1 at this time.

b. J-2

The J-2 is the Intelligence Directorate. The J-2 provides all-source intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and unified commands. The J-2 is unique on the Joint Staff because it is also part of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), a combat support agency. The J-2 apprises the Chairman of foreign situations and intelligence issues relevant to current operational interests and potential national security policies, objectives and strategy. This includes providing indications, warning and crisis intelligence support, supporting unified command intelligence requirements, developing joint intelligence doctrine, developing joint architecture, coordinating support requirements, and providing targeting support.³² Currently there are no National Guard personnel assigned to the J-2. The issue area for the National Guard in the J-2 is the J2R. The J2R is the Reserve Component manager that oversees the employment of reserve forces in support of the J-2.

<www.afsc.edu/pub1/afsc021z.htm>. [26 January 2000].

³² "Mission of the Directorate for Intelligence." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/j2.html>. [24 January 2000].

(1) J2R Division. The J2R manages all military reserve issues for the J-2 and advises the J-2 on all RC matters. Specific duties include assisting J-2 Functional Managers in addressing issues which impact the Reserve intelligence component and its utilization, ensuring J-2 reserve assets are fully integrated into the J-2 mission, determining J-2 roles and missions that can be fulfilled by reserve assets, and the employment of RC forces in support of the J-2. The J2R is responsible for providing the J2 with peacetime intelligence production and watch standing support as well as capability to meet exercise, contingency operations, surge requirements, and special intelligence taskings. National Guard representation in this division would help integrate National Guard intelligence assets into joint operations and increase Joint Staff awareness of Guard capabilities. The Guard would also benefit by providing its members with J-2 experience through Active Duty Special Work (ADSW) and Active Duty Training (ADT) tour opportunities in support of J-2 operations.

J2R Recommendation. Recommend creating a new National Guard position in the J-2R and assigning an E-8 (ARNG or ANG non-commissioned officer) to work within the J2R to integrate National Guard personnel into J2 operations.

c. J-3

The J-3 is the Directorate for Operations. The responsibilities of the J-3 are to assist in the direction and control of operations and plan, coordinate and integrate operations. The mission of the J-3 is to assist the Chairman in carrying out his responsibilities as the principal advisor to the National Command Authority (NCA) by developing and providing guidance to the combatant commands and by relaying communications between the authority and unified commanders regarding current operations and plans. The J-3 is the directorate that moves military forces, conducts detailed operational briefings to the national leadership and serves as the operational link between the warfighting Commanders in Chief and the NCA. The J-3 is responsible for

synchronizing and monitoring worldwide military operations and activities in support of a national military strategy emphasizing flexible and selective engagement.³³

The J-3 is lead by a three star general or flag officer and is authorized 242 officers, 86 enlisted personnel and 22 civilians. Currently there are three National Guard personnel assigned to the J-3, an ANG Operations Officer in the Readiness Division (an ANG O6), an Operations Officer whose position is to be deleted (an ANG O4), and a Reserve Forces Advisor (an ARNG O5). The issue areas for the National Guard in the J-3 are the Readiness Division, the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) branch, the Deputy Director for Information Operations, the Defense and Space Operations Division, and the Special Operations Division.

(1) Readiness Division. The Readiness Division was formed in response to a tasking by the CJCS to define, measure and fix joint readiness. The division redefined readiness to include a view of readiness from the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war and is the single point of contact for all current readiness issues. In order to collect, analyze, measure and begin fixing joint readiness, the division implemented the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR) which is briefed monthly to the VCJCS.³⁴

In addition to the JMRR, the division chairs one of the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) teams on joint readiness. The team influences the planning, programming, and budgeting process by providing inputs to the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR). Additionally, the Readiness Division has responsibility for the Status of Resources and Training System, DOD's central automated registry, which keeps track of

³³ "Directorate for Operations (J-3)." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/j3.html>. [24 January 2000].

³⁴ "Directorate for Operations (J-3)." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/j3.html>. [24 January 2000].

all operational U.S. Military units and indicates the level of resources and training status required to undertake missions for which the units were organized.³⁵

Readiness Division Recommendation. The National Guard is authorized and has assigned an ANG O-6 to the Readiness Division. The position's responsibilities include advising the J-3 Director on RC readiness, developing readiness briefings used by the CJCS and the SecDef to update the President and Congress, writing the Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress, and providing readiness input to the DPG and CJCS Program Recommendations and Program Assessment. Recommend continued assignment of an O-6 (ARNG or ANG) to this authorized position.

(2) JFCOM Branch. JFCOM is the lead organization in domestic operations such as Homeland Defense, Consequence Management, and National Disaster Response. JFCOM is also responsible for Military Support to Civilian Authority (MSCA), Weapons of Mass Destruction/Consequence management (WMD/CM), NORAD support, and Counter Drug missions. The National Guard has traditionally been a critical element in these domestic response missions.

When interviewed, a current J-3 JFCOM member said a National Guard representative would greatly enhance its ability to accomplish its missions by providing National Guard planning expertise.³⁶ The Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism echoed the same comments saying they would utilize a National Guard representative for coordinating and planning the use of Guard assets in their planning processes.³⁷

The JFCOM Branch also reviews unified command operational plans, contingency plans and proposed rules of engagement for specific operations to

³⁵ "Directorate for Operations (J-3)." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/j3.html>. [24 January 2000].

³⁶ Interview with LTC Hans Meinhardt, USA, JFCOM branch, WESTHEM division, J-3, 10 April 2000.

³⁷ Interview with LTC Williams, USA, Deputy Directorate for Combating Terrorism, Plans and Policy Division, J-3, 11 April 00.

ensure consistency with national standing rules and other applicable guidance. JFCOM also serves as the J-3 point of contact for operational military matters concerning federal military support of civil defense, civil disturbances and civil emergencies. Finally, the division prepares special studies and analysis related to operational matters and provides recommended courses of action.

JFCOM Branch Recommendation. Recommend creating a new position for the National Guard in the J-3 JFCOM Branch and assigning an O-5 (ARNG) to integrate the Guard into JFCOM planning, to include the future Homeland Defense roles and missions identified in RCE 2005.

(3) Information Operations, Operations Division (IO/DO). Within the Information Operations Directorate is the Capabilities Division. The Capabilities Division provides Information Operations (IO) and Special Technical Operations (STO) staff support to the JCS, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and Combatant Commanders. This Division is important to the Guard because it provides the Guard with an active liaison on the development of joint policy, strategy and doctrine concerning Information Operations/Information Warfare (IO/IW).

IO/DO Recommendations. The National Guard is authorized this position but it is currently vacant. The position's responsibilities include providing IO and STO staff support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the SecDef, and Combatant Commanders; providing a focal point in the directorate for computer network attack and computer network defense; developing joint policy, strategy, and doctrine concerning IO/IW policy operations, and programs with the joint staff, OSD, the services, intelligence community, defense agencies and the Unified Commands; and support the National Command Authorities, the CJCS, and the Unified Commanders in the command, control, and conduct of IO/IW. Recommend assigning an O-4 (ARNG or ANG) to this authorized position.

(4) Defense and Space Operations Division. The Defense Space Operations Division is organized into two functional branches, the Joint Missile and Air Defense Branch and the Space Operations Branch. The Joint Missile and Air Defense

Branch is the J-3 focal point for air and missile defense issues. The Space Branch is the joint sponsor for the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program, which provides the warfighting Commanders in Chief with the means to leverage our space forces. The Director of the Defense and Space Operations Division stated that if the Guard were tasked with the NMD mission, it would be very important for the Guard to have representation in the Defense and Space Operations Division. A National Guard representative in this capacity would be a reference for the Defense and Space Operations Division on the NMD as well as other National Guard assets in support of space, missile and air defense branches.

Defense and Space Operations Division Recommendation.

Recommend creating a National Guard position in the Defense and Space Operations Division and assigning an O-5 (ARNG or ANG) to represent and integrate the Guard into joint space operations.

(5) Special Operations Division. The Special Operations Division is responsible for Joint Staff matters relating to operational aspects of employing special operations forces, including special, psychological operations and civil affairs forces. Special operations involve unconventional warfare, weapons counterproliferation, counterterrorism, direct action, foreign internal defense, psychological operations, special reconnaissance and civil affairs. The division consists of five functional branches: Special Operations Forces, Support Activities, Operational Support, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, and Counterproliferation.

Each branch ensures policy, strategy, doctrine and resource guidance are integrated into the National Military Strategy, joint doctrine and other joint initiatives. The division coordinates with unified commands for special operations forces execution of operational plans and contingency plans, deployment of required special operations forces and coordination with other government agencies. In addition to ANG support to the Special Operations, the ARNG has two Special Forces Groups. A National Guard Special Operations Force (SOF) integrator would provide the Special Operations Division with Guard expertise in planning for their use.

Special Operations Division Recommendation. The National Guard is authorized this position but it is currently vacant. The responsibilities of this position are to act as an advisor to the Chief, Special Operations Division on all aspects of RC Special Operations Forces (SOF); responsibility for all actions relating to readiness, training, exercises, mobilization and validation; coordinate with the CNGB, Office, Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) and Army Reserve Personnel Center to expedite operational planning and execution; and serve as a member of the CJCS crisis action team in the National Military Command Center (NMCC) during crisis and contingency operations. Recommend assigning an O-5 (ARNG) to insure National Guard Special Forces are represented and integrated into joint operations.

d. J-4

The J-4 is the Logistics Directorate. The responsibilities of the Logistics Directorate are to formulate logistic plans; coordinate and supervise supply, maintenance, repair, evacuation, transportation, construction, and related logistics matters; and ensure effective logistics support for all forces in the command.

The J-4 is lead by a three star general or flag officer and is authorized 63 officers, 8 enlisted personnel and 12 civilians. Currently the National Guard has one person assigned to the J-4, an ANG Advisor (an ANG O6). The issue areas for the National Guard in the J-4 are the Deployment Division, the International Logistics and Exercises Division, and the Logistics Readiness Center.

(1) Deployment Division. The Deployment Division was created from a special action group formed to study lessons learned from the Joint Endeavor deployment to Bosnia. The Deployment Division is designed as a think tank to improve the deployment processes and deployment systems. The Deployment Division is important to the Guard because it would give the Guard representation in improving the joint deployment process for National Guard units by addressing Guard specific issues.

Deployment Division Recommendation. Recommend assigning the current authorized but vacant J-4 ARNG O-6 advisor position to the Deployment Division.

(2) International Logistics and Exercises (ILE) Division. The ILE Division supports the CJCS with up to date information on international logistics and engineering issues involving CINCs, Services, DOD Agencies, and others as required. International Logistics issues include bilateral and multinational contingency support, multinational logistics doctrine, interagency policy participation, and United Nations and NATO logistics liaison. Engineering issues include engineer support to current operations, doctrine development, exercise-related operationally-focused construction, environmental concerns and others. ILE also serves as the multinational logistics and civil engineering support concept developer and enabler for Focused Logistics.

ILE Division Recommendation. The National Guard is authorized and has assigned an ANG O-6 to the ILE Division. The position's responsibilities include supervising the development and use of global logistic resources to enhance readiness; developing national policy and operational planning for mobilization, medical, industrial base, sustainability, programming/budgeting, transportation and international logistics; and overseeing logistics doctrine and Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA). Recommend continued assignment of an O-6 (ANG) to this authorized position.

(3) Logistics Readiness Center. The LRC manages current logistical operations and responds to crisis actions from the National Military Command Center. The LRC is organized to manage daily logistics actions, as well as actions required during periods of national emergency, heightened international tensions, exercises, and extraordinary situations that require intensive management. These actions include response to disasters and humanitarian relief requests. The LRC provides the nucleus staff and facilities necessary to meet the logistics taskings of the Chairman and higher authorities during crisis.³⁸

³⁸ "Logistics Directorate (J-4)." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/J4.html>. [9 May 2000].

Logistics Readiness Center Recommendation. Recommend creating a new National Guard position and assigning an O-5 (ARNG or ANG) in the J-4 Logistics Readiness Center to integrate the Guard into all LRC operations.

e. J-5

The J-5 is the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate. The J-5 is the focal point for assisting the CJCS in current and future military strategy, planning guidance and policy, politico-military advice and policies, military positions on projected and ongoing international negotiations, and interagency coordination within these areas. The J-5 is responsible for assisting commanders with long-range or future planning, preparing campaign and operation plans, and preparing estimates of the situation.³⁹

The J-5 is lead by a three star general or flag officer and is authorized 152 officers, 23 enlisted personnel and 21 civilians. Currently the National Guard is authorized one position in the J-5 which is vacant. The issue areas for the National Guard in the J-5 are the Strategic Plans Branch and the Interagency Policy Section.

(1) Strategic Plans Branch. The Strategic Plans Branch is a sub-element of the Deputy Directorate for Strategy and Policy (DDS&P). The DDS&P is the focal point for the strategic planning required to prepare our Armed Forces for the 21st century. In part, the directorate satisfies this responsibility through the development of the NMS. In concert with this strategy, the directorate develops advice for planning and programming guidance and recommends inputs to the Secretary of Defense in preparation of his contingency planning guidance. A landmark example of the directorate's work in this regard is the development of Theater Engagement Planning, a new strategic planning system that parallels the existing deliberate planning process for contingencies.⁴⁰

³⁹ "Functions of Joint Staff Divisions." The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1997: Available [Online]: <www.afsc.edu/pub1/afsc021z.htm>. [26 January 2000].

⁴⁰ "Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5)." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Homepage (2000): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/J5.html>. [9 May 2000].

The directorate is also responsible for reviewing the strategic environment for trends and issues that affect national security planning. The mechanism for this analysis is the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) that recommends, as necessary, enhancements and incremental changes to the current NMS and identifies alternative strategies for the future. The directorate also develops the Chairman's strategic long-range vision for the future. The current document, *Joint Vision 2010*, is the conceptual blueprint for how the Armed Forces will leverage technological advances, integrate new operational concepts, and channel the vitality and innovation of our services to achieve more seamless and coherent joint operations in the future. Additionally, the directorate is responsible for developing the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) that apportions forces to the Warfighting Commanders in Chief.⁴¹

Within the area of policy development, DDS&P is responsible for leading the Chairman's biennial review of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and developing Joint Staff positions on such key issues as the organization, roles and missions, and functions of the Armed Forces and the combatant commands. The directorate also plays an important role in advising the JROC. DDS&P is also responsible for coordinating the activities of two Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) teams dealing with the issues of Deterrence/Counterproliferation and Regional Engagement/Overseas Presence.⁴²

Strategic Plans Branch Recommendation. Recommend creating a new position in the J-5 Strategic Plans Branch and assigning an O-5 (ARNG or ANG) to represent the National Guard in the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs).

⁴¹ "Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5)." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Homepage (2000): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/J5.html>. [9 May 2000].

⁴² "Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5)." The Joint Chiefs of Staff Homepage (2000): Available

(2) **Interagency Policy Section.** The Interagency Policy Section coordinates with government and non government agencies and is responsible to provide military advice to the National Command Authority (NCA), be a spokesman for the Unified Combatant Commanders, develop and oversee joint policy, and insure compliance with established DOD policy. Additionally, the Interagency Policy Section is responsible for new presidential administration transitions, CINC conferences, Joint Staff off-sites, and interaction with the State Department.⁴³

Interagency Policy Section Recommendation. The National Guard is authorized this position but it is currently vacant. The position's responsibilities include participating in the biennial review of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and triennial reviews of roles, missions, and functions of the Armed Forces; act as the J-5 interface with the J-8 on Reserve fiscal policy issues and coordinate with the J-3 on Reserve force capabilities for operations other than war, total force policy, counterdrug, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation policy issues. Additionally, provide a Reserve perspective for CJCS sponsored exercises; joint doctrine, tactics, and techniques development; and issues related to the development and coordination of space-related policy and mission areas including theater missile defense. Recommend assigning an O-5 (ARNG) to the currently vacant position.

f. J-6

The J-6 is the Directorate for Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems (C4). The mission of the J-6 is to provide the CJCS advice and recommendations on C4 matters, support warfighters from the CINC to the shooter, lead the C4 community, oversee support for the National Military Command System, and lead

[Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/J5.html>. [9 May 2000].

⁴³ Interview with CDR Joyce, J-5 Interagency Policy Section, 11 April 2000.

in identifying and resolving military aspects of information-based issues of national importance.⁴⁴

The J-6 is lead by a three star general or flag officer and is authorized 90 officers, 13 enlisted personnel and 21 civilians. Currently there are two National Guard personnel assigned to the J-6, a Reserve Component Advisor (an ANG O6), and a RC Global Positioning System Officer (an ANG O5). The issue areas for the National Guard in the J-6 are the Directorate RC Advisor, Technology and Architecture Division, and the RC C4 Assessment Division.

(1) Directorate RC Advisor. The J6 RC advisor provides recommendations and guidance on C4 issues affecting the Total Force and specifically the RC, which account for approximately 50 percent of the tactical C4 capabilities. Additionally, the RC advisor is responsible to review and comment on Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for RC C4 inputs; monitors RC force structure and equipment issues to ensure CINC support is not degraded or inconsistent with stated CINC requirements; coordinates with counternarcotics C4I network planning, development, implementation and execution; supports the J-3 Counternarcotics Operations Division by coordinating C4 system support to operational tasking; serves as the RC representative on working groups for C4I issues where RC issues are addressed and are integral to the Total Force policy; maintain liaison with DOD, RC headquarters and gaining active duty major commands to ensure continuity and currency of service related activities; and advises and represents the J-6 at Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS) reviews at the DOD level.⁴⁵

Directorate RC Advisor Recommendation. Recommend continuing to fill this position with an O-6 (ARNG or ANG).

⁴⁴ "Mission of the J-6 Directorate." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/j6.html>. [24 January 2000].

⁴⁵ "Duty Description." Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, J6 RC Advisor to the J-6, JS Form

(2) Technology and Architecture Division. The Air National Guard Liaison Officer to the J-6 Technology and Architecture Division is responsible for providing analysis, assessment and recommendations to the J-6, CJCS, OSD and Congress on Joint Warfighter requirements, capabilities and shortfalls. Additional responsibilities include development, coordination, and staffing of requirements and policies that insure all U.S. and allied forces are provided reliable positioning, navigation and timing information; ensure RC future capability to be interoperable with the active services through the CJCS's Global Position System (GPS) security mandate; interface with the JWCA process to preserve warfighter capabilities on GPS; co-chair the Joint SATCOM (Satellite Communications) Panel that reviews and validates all DOD SATCOM requirements; prepare and staff the CJCS's Master Positioning, Navigation and Timing Plan which implements the DOD's Positioning and Navigation (Pos/Nav) policy, validate Pos/Nav requirements, compare requirements to existing technology, identify performance shortfalls, highlight needed research and development, and provide long-term projections of anticipated capabilities.⁴⁶

Technology and Architecture Division Recommendation.

Recommend continuing to fill the current position in the J-6 with an O-5 (ANG).

(3) RC C4 Assessment Division. The RC C4 Assessment officer is responsible for providing a Total Force perspective in developing C4 assessment methodology and preparing C4 assessments for the CJCS and SecDef. Additional responsibilities include evaluating CINC C4 requirements and mission needs; identifying C4 issues and formulating Joint Staff recommendations on courses of action; developing joint C4 program priorities in support of the NMS and its objectives; prepare and present recommendations to the VCJCS and JROC on C4 JWCA; collaborate on warfighting

70A, 10 Jan 97

⁴⁶ "Duty Description." Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, RC C4 Assessment Officer, JS Form 70A, 11 May 00

assessments and reports to Congress, such as the Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA); collaborate on JSPS, PPBS and DPG; Coordinate with OSD, the Joint Staff; Agencies and RC headquarters to insure currency of joint activities.⁴⁷

RC C4 Assessment Division Recommendation. Recommend continuing to fill the current position with an O-5 (ARNG or ANG).

g. J-7

The J-7 is the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate. Key products the J-7 is responsible for are the Joint Training Policy (provides CJCS policy for joint training and addresses the importance of preparing U.S. Forces for multinational and interagency operations), Joint Training Master Plan 2000 (provides guidance from the CJCS to the combatant commands and services for planning and conducting joint training and exercises), Joint Training Manual (provides guidance for implementing CJCS's policy for planning and conducting joint training within the Joint Training System), and the Universal Joint Task List (provides a standardized tool for describing requirements in the planning, conducting, assessing, and evaluating joint and multinational training).⁴⁸

Each J-7 division serves a key role in the overall interoperability process. Conventional War Plans provide U.S. armed forces the "what" to train for and be ready to do. Doctrine tells joint forces "how" to train and operate. Exercises and Training provides the "how" to practice for deployable joint forces. The Joint Warfighting Center provides the "how" to train joint commanders and staffs. Education is the "how" to develop creative and critical analysis capability in joint warfighters and strategists. Evaluation and Analysis is the "how" to make sure we have it right and are truly interoperable. Just as interoperability institutionalizes teamwork, the focused process

⁴⁷ "Duty Description." Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, JS Form 70A, 26 Jan 96

⁴⁸ "Joint Exercise and Training Division." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/jetd.html>. [24 January 2000].

within J-7 generates synergy -- the resulting interoperable team is more powerful than its individual parts.⁴⁹

The J-7 is lead by a two star general or flag officer and is authorized 54 officers, 10 enlisted personnel and 10 civilians. Currently, there are three National Guard officers assigned to the J-7, a RC advisor (an ARNG O6), and two RC Conventional War Planners (both ARNG O4's). The issue areas for the National Guard in the J-7 are the Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division, the Conventional War Plans Division, the Joint Assessment and Analysis Division, and the Joint Vision and Doctrine Division.

(1) Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division. The Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division develops joint training and exercise policies and procedures to ensure our forces are prepared to fight as a team. The division is organized into three branches to perform these functions, the Joint Training Branch, the CINC Exercise branch, and the Joint Exercise Branch.

The Joint Training Branch develops and implements joint training policy and guidance for the Chairman by publishing "CJCS Joint Training Policy for the U.S. Armed Forces." The branch is the architect and advocate of the Chairman's Joint Training System, the process joint commanders use to identify training requirements, develop effective training plans, conduct joint training and assess its effectiveness. The branch also coordinates modeling and simulation policy for joint training and exercises.⁵⁰

The CINC Exercise Branch plays a key role in the Chairman's joint training program through management and oversight of major issues for unified command joint and multinational exercises. The Chairman's exercise funds are used to pay for strategic transportation -- to include airlift, sealift, port handling and inland transportation -- for exercises in the schedule. The CINC Exercise Branch also manages

⁴⁹ "Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7)." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/jetd.html>. [24 January 2000].

⁵⁰ "Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7)." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999):

the Commanders in Chief Initiatives Fund. This fund supports low-cost, high-benefit initiatives that enhance warfighting capabilities, readiness and sustainability of forces assigned to the unified commands.⁵¹

The Chairman's Sponsored Joint Exercise Training Branch manages five national-level exercise programs. These exercises focus on plans, policies, procedures and training required to ensure our senior leaders can effectively direct and integrate U.S. and coalition military forces during war. These large command post exercises are usually conducted annually to examine crisis management procedures for mobilization, deployment, employment and sustainment of forces worldwide.⁵²

The Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division continues to advance the effectiveness of joint training through the Better Exercises and Training Campaign. Their exercise program review ensures unified command exercises support national strategy while using the most effective training mediums for the intended training audience. The division continues to develop the Joint Training System. This system is the Chairman's principal tool to implement joint force training policy. The system defines a multistep approach to identify requirements and plan, program, conduct and assess joint training events. Early system development concentrated on the orderly and detailed identification of training requirements.

Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division Recommendation. The National Guard is authorized and has assigned an ARNG O-6 to the Joint Doctrine, Education and Training Division. Recommend continued assignment of an O-6 (ARNG) to this authorized position.

Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/jetd.html>. [24 January 2000].

⁵¹ "Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7)." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/jetd.html>. [24 January 2000].

⁵² "Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7)." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/jetd.html>. [24 January 2000].

(2) Conventional War Plans Division. The Conventional War Plans Division is responsible for the deliberate planning process and for implementing the Chairman's vision of creating the best possible plans. Military planners conduct deliberate planning when they have the luxury of time. The deliberate planning process clearly establishes force capabilities and provides the opportunity to evaluate a broad range of available options. By using the same campaign planning principles used in crisis action plans, deliberate planning's greatest benefit is easing the transition from peace to war in the event of a crisis.

Conventional War Plans Division Recommendation. The National Guard is authorized and has assigned two ARNG O-4's to the Conventional Warplans Division. Recommend continued assignment of two O-4/O-5's (ARNG or ANG) to the two authorized positions. One position is responsible for TEPs and MTW planning, and the other is responsible for Annexes A and T of the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

(3) Joint Assessment and Analysis Division (JAAD). The JAAD provides the CJCS an independent assessment of CINC warfighting readiness through the Remedial Action Plan (RAP), the Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP), and the JWCA Program. The Division functionally links assessments, lessons learned, and corrective actions to improve joint warfighting effectiveness.

Joint Assessment and Analysis Division Recommendation. Recommend creating a position in the Joint Assessment and Analysis Division and assigning an O-5 (ARNG) to the position to represent the Guard in the RAP, JLLP, and JWCA programs.

(4) Joint Vision and Doctrine Division. Joint doctrine is a key element in the interoperability process. Joint Doctrine is the "how" of joint interoperability; it is the playbook by which our team develops the game plan for practice and execution. Joint doctrine fundamentally shapes the way we think about and prepare for warfighting and operations other than war. It offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate. Although it is not policy and does not replace a commander's

good judgement, joint doctrine represents authoritative guidance for the joint employment of the U.S. armed forces.⁵³

Joint Vision and Doctrine Division Recommendation.

Recommend creating a position in the J-7 Joint Vision and Doctrine Division and assigning an O-5 (ARNG) to the position.

h. J-8

The J-8 is the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate. The J-8 was established in response to the increased responsibilities and authority placed on the Chairman by the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986. The J-8 provides resource and force structure analysis and advice to the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A focal point of the J-8 is the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) where the J-8 provides much of the assessment of the council's review of defense resource policy on a myriad of items.⁵⁴

The J-8 also assesses and recommends near-, mid-, and long-term force structure to support national security objectives, policy and strategy. The Division is also responsible for the "Forces for the Unified Commands," the force tables for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the *Strategic Forces Mix DataBase Handbook*. Additionally, it is the joint staff lead in major studies such as the Congressionally mandated Roles and Missions Commission and Reserve Component Integration Studies.⁵⁵

The J-8 is lead by a three star general or flag officer and is authorized 111 officers, 12 enlisted personnel and 22 civilians. Currently, there is one National Guard

⁵³ "Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate (J-7)." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/jetd.html>. [24 January 2000].

⁵⁴ "Shaping the Force for a Dynamic World." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/j8.html>. [24 January 2000].

⁵⁵ "Shaping the Force for a Dynamic World." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/j8.html>. [24 January 2000].

officer (an ARNG O5) assigned to the J-8 Joint Requirements Division as a Reserve Forces Analyst. The issue areas for the National Guard in the J-8 are the Joint Requirements Division and the Joint Warfighting Analysis Division.

(1) Joint Requirements Division. The Requirements, Assessments and Integration Division is the J-8 executive agent for the responsibilities of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) secretary. The Division is also the proponent for planning, coordinating and integrating the activities of the entire Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process. This responsibility includes focusing the assessment efforts of the joint assessment teams, executing the JROC visits with the unified commands and supporting the development of critical policy documents such as the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR), Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) and Joint Military Net Assessment. Finally, the Division employs a joint warfighting perspective to analyze operational requirements from development of Mission-Needs Statements (MNSs) through acquisition Milestone Zero.

Joint Requirements Division Recommendation. Recommend continuing to fill the current position in the J-8 Joint Requirements Division, however, the role, responsibilities and access to the J-8 leadership need to be expanded.

(2) Warfighting Analysis Division. The Warfighting Analysis Division conducts studies and analyses of conventional forces and, to a limited degree, strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. The Division uses a broad range of operations research methods to analyze the plans, programs, strategies and policies that define military sufficiency and force capabilities.

Warfighting Analysis Division Recommendations. Recommend creating a new O-5 position (ARNG) in the Joint Warfighting Analysis Division to represent the National Guard.

i. DOM

The Directorate of Management (DOM) is organized into five offices and is one of the largest directorates. The DOM provides assistance to the CJCS and the Joint Staff through management, planning and direction of support activities including

correspondence administration, budget and finance, action management and archiving, information technology, services, resources and all aspects of staff and information security.⁵⁶

The DOM is lead by a Colonel or Navy Captain and is authorized 26 officers, 83 enlisted personnel and 55 civilians. Currently, there is one National Guard officer (an ARNG O4) assigned to the DOM as the Joint Staff RC Advisor for Site R. The issue area for the National Guard in the DOM is the Joint Staff RC Advisor for Site R.

(1) Joint Staff RC Advisor, Site R. Site R is a relocation facility and National Military Command System node for use in the event of evacuation of the Pentagon. This position provides for Guard/Reserve presence at the site. The RC advisor also coordinates Guard/Reserve actions for the JCS Crisis Action Team support for exercises and for the Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) concerning relocation team support activities. Additionally, the RC advisor assists DOM with oversight responsibility of the Site R Joint Staff Information Resource Management Office network systems and coordinates RC requirements in the planning actions.⁵⁷

Joint Staff RC Advisor, Site R Recommendation. Recommend continuing to fill this position. In the event Site R is used, for a real mission or for training, this position will be critically important.

j. Existing Positions Not Already Addressed

The National Guard has four positions on the Joint Staff that have not specifically been addressed thus far. The four positions are in the ACJCS/NG Office and the Joint History Office. The positions are certainly important as evidenced in the duty descriptions of each position, however, many of their duties replicate duties already being

⁵⁶ "Directorate of Management." The Joint Staff Homepage (1999): Available [Online]: <www.dtic.mil/jcs/core/dom.html>. [24 January 2000].

⁵⁷ "Duty Description." Joint Staff Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, RC Advisor, Site R. JS

performed within the Joint Directorates. The concern with replication of effort is it adds another step in the process and the Guard does not have enough resources to duplicate efforts. The following is a review of each position and a recommendation on where the position might be more advantageous for the National Guard.

(1) ACJCS/NG Strategic Planner. The duty description for this position includes representing the ACJCS/NG in the strategic planning process to identify RC inequities and facilitate RC representation in the documentation preparation process, coordinate with the J-7 Conventional Warplans Division to insure appropriate RC inclusion in the CINC OPLANS/CONPLANS/TEPs, and maintaining access and working capability on the GCCS/JOPEs applications and computer systems vital to ongoing analysis and review of RC equity.⁵⁸

The J-5 is the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate in the Joint Staff and one that could greatly influence joint integration of the Guard in the areas described in this position's duties. Recommend this position be re-assigned to the recommended new J-5 Strategy Division position responsible to work with the NSS, NMS, JSCP, JDP and TEP's.

(2) ACJCS/NG Force Advisor. The duty description for this position includes conducting analysis of DOD plans, programs, policies, initiatives and concepts to determine implications for the use of the RC in carrying out the NMS; develop recommendations to enhance RC integration; represent the ACJCS/NG in the RCE 2005 Study, Mobility Requirements Study – 05 (MRS-05), and the DPG; team chief for the Studies, Strategy, and Plans areas of operation; insures RC is represented in Joint

Form 70A, December 1992.

⁵⁸ "Duty Description." Joint Staff Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, ACJCS (NG/RM) Strategic Planner. JS Form 70A, December 1992.

Staff forums and RC Subject Matter Experts (SME's) are included in Joint Staff studies and committees; participate as the senior non-flag RC representative on all Joint Staff studies; act as the RC representative on the MRS-05 Battle Staff; attend the Joint Review Panel; serve on the JSR steering group and the Army Strategic Mobility Panel; and develop, coordinate and assign plans and JWCA officers to their Joint Staff activities.⁵⁹

Recommend the senior Guard member (an O-6) assume this role on the Joint Staff. The duties described in this position could be tasked out by the senior member to the SME's in each directorate and consolidated as required.

(3) ACJCS/NG JRB/JWCA Action Officer. The duty description for this position includes coordinating RC representation within the twelve JWCA panels, attend pre-JROC meetings to identify issues of interest in the RC community and prepare the ACJCS/NG to attend the JROC Review Boards (JRB) and/or the JROC, and provide an RC perspective on key issues affecting the Total Force.⁶⁰ Recommend the senior Guard member on the Joint Staff who has JWCA panel responsibilities assume the responsibilities of this position.

(4) Joint History Office, RC Advisor. The duty description for this position includes advising the Director for Joint History on the RC role in carrying out the Joint History program; representing the Director in discussion with service historians, joint command history offices, and RC representatives on policy issues

⁵⁹ "Duty Description." Joint Staff Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, Force Advisor. JS Form 70A, December 1992.

⁶⁰ "Duty Description." Joint Staff Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, JRB/JWCA Action

relating to the utilization of RC historians; advise the Director on policy, program and procedures for joint training, on responding to requests from combatant commands for individual RC historians or teams to perform joint missions, on tables of organization and equipment for joint history organizations, and on operating procedures; maintain an up-to-date knowledge of availability, readiness, training and deployability of RC historians as teams and individuals; update training plans, track availability of equipment compatible with that used by deploying joint commands, continuously reassess table of equipment and operating procedures; monitor work of military personnel assigned to the Joint Staff History Office; and assist the Director and the Chiefs of the Joint Operational and Joint Staff History Branches to evaluate and prepare manuscripts for publication and distribution to military schools, subordinate commands, and military journals.⁶¹

Recommend re-assigning this position to the J-3 Directorate to the proposed JFCOM Branch position. This position is certainly one of significance and is beneficial; however, due to limited Guard resources it is a nicety, not a necessity.

B. SUMMARY

The National Guard's role on the Joint Chiefs of Staff needs to be increased in the key areas that directly influence joint integration of the National Guard. The positions recommended in this chapter are areas that have the greatest impact on joint integration of the Guard. The goal is not to increase the numerical representation, but rather the influential representation of the Guard on the JCS. In a further step, the recommended positions in this chapter are placed in priority order in Chapter V (Figure 5-1).

Officer. JS Form 70A, December 1992.

⁶¹ "Duty Description." Joint Staff Request for Nomination of Officer Personnel, RC Advisor, Joint

In many cases, the positions recommended already exist, but not all-existing positions were recommended. The positions in section I, d., "Existing positions not already addressed," of this chapter already exist, but are lower in priority than the other positions recommended within the Joint Staff. The implication of the recommendations is some existing positions should be given up in favor of recommended positions of higher priority to best support joint integration of the National Guard.

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V. IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. THE NEED FOR A LARGER ROLE ON THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The recommendation to increase the number of full-time National Guard general officers, officers and senior non-commissioned officers in the Joint Staff and other joint organizations is consistent with the recommendations of RCE 2005 and is supported by the Reserve Forces Policy Board.⁶² Creating more staff positions in such organizations, however, will be a resource challenge for the National Guard. The Guard already faces this challenge throughout its full-time force and has identified full-time support as its number one unfunded requirement to Congress. If increasing the National Guard role numerically on the JCS is not possible; it is imperative the Guard representatives already there are in the positions that most benefit joint integration of the Guard. The National Guard may decide to maintain its current strength on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or increase it gradually as resources become available; the recommendations in figure 5-1 support either case.

In order to account for the resourcing issues the National Guard faces; the recommendations for increasing the role of the National Guard are presented in the form of a "1-N list." The 1-N list (figure 5-1) is a prioritized listing of the current and recommended positions for the Guard on the JCS. The goal of the 1-N list is to prioritize the positions in the order in which they will impact the joint integration of the Guard. If the Guard decides to maintain its current strength, but maximize its effectiveness, the current personnel should be re-assigned within the JCS to fill the highest priority positions. If the National Guard decides to gradually increase its representation, as

⁶² Booz, Allen and Hamilton. The Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (2 August 1999): Available [Online]: <www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005_072299.html>. [28 January 2000].

resources become available, the positions should be filled in the priority order recommended on the 1-N list.

B. THE RECOMMENDATIONS

The following (Figure 5-1) lists recommended positions, in priority order, by directorate, within the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

| PRIORITY | DIRECTORATE/POSITION | RESPONSIBILITIES | RANK | ANG/ARNG | NEW POS'N |
|----------|---|-------------------------------------|------|----------|-------------|
| 1 | ACJCS/NG | Primary NG assistant to CJCS | O-8 | | No(ARNG) |
| 2 | ACJCS/NG / XO | Primary assistant to ACJCS/NG | O-5 | ANG | No (ANG) |
| 3 | J-7 / Joint Doctrine, Ed and Training Div | RC integration into J-7 | O-6 | ARNG | No (ARNG) |
| 4 | J-3 / JFCOM Branch | Integrate NG into JFCOM CM msn | O-5 | ARNG | Yes |
| 5 | J-7 / Conventional War Plans | TEP/2nd MTW | O-5 | ARNG | No (ARNG) |
| 6 | J-7 / Conventional War Plans | Annex A & T/JOPES | O-5 | ARNG | No (ARNG) |
| 7 | J-7 / Joint Vision and Doctrine Division | DOCNET, JDOL, ADL | O-5 | | Yes |
| 8 | J-8 / Joint Requirements Division | RC Integration | O-5 | ARNG | No (ARNG) |
| 9 | J-3 / Information Operations Division | Liaison and coordination for IO/IW | O-4 | ANG | No (vacant) |
| 10 | J-5 / Strategy Division | NSS, NMS, JSCP, JDP, TEPs | O-5 | | Yes |
| 11 | J-5 / Interagency Policy Section | RC advisor for UCP, roles/missions | O-5 | ARNG | No (vacant) |
| 12 | J-6 / Directorate RC Advisor | RC advisor for J-6 | O-6 | ANG | No (ANG) |
| 13 | J-3 / Readiness Division | Advise J-3 on RC readiness | O-6 | ANG | No (ANG) |
| 14 | J-7 / Joint Assessment and Analysis Div | RC mobilization, JAARS and RAP | O-5 | | Yes |
| 15 | J-6 / Technology and Architecture Div | Advise J-6 on space related issues | O-5 | ANG | No (ANG) |
| 16 | J-8 / Joint Warfighting Analysis Div | RC integration into MTW, SSCs | O-5 | ARNG | Yes |
| 17 | J-6 / RC C4 Assessment Division | JWCA assessment officer | W-5 | ARNG | No (ARNG) |
| 18 | J-3 / Special Operations Division | Advise J-3 on RC SOF | O-5 | ARNG | No (vacant) |
| 19 | J-3 / Defense and Space Opns Division | National Missile Defense | O-4 | | Yes |
| 20 | J-4 / Deployment Div/ARNG Advisor | ARNG advisor/deployments | O-6 | ARNG | No (vacant) |
| 21 | J-4 / Int'l log & Exercises/ANG Advisor | Develop global logistics resources | O-5 | ANG | No (ANG) |
| 22 | J-2 / J2R | Integrate NG into J-2 operations | E-8 | | Yes |
| 23 | OCJCS / Legislative Assistant Office | Represent NG JCS issues | O-5 | | Yes |
| 24 | OCJCS / Public Affairs Office | NG Public Affairs for Joint Opns | E-8 | | Yes |
| 25 | J-4 / Logistics Readiness Center (LRC) | RC Advisor for LRC | O-5 | | Yes |
| 26 | DOM / Chief Operations RC | Joint Staff RC advisor, Site R | O-4 | ARNG | No (ARNG) |
| 27 | ACJCS/NG / Strategic Planner | Rep ACJCS in strat planning docs | O-5 | ARNG | No (ARNG) |
| 28 | ACJCS/NG / Force Advisor | Implications of RC use in NMS | O-6 | ARNG | No (ARNG) |
| 29 | ACJCS/NG / JRB,JWCA Action Officer | RC rep on JWCA, JRB/JROC | O-5 | ARNG | No (ARNG) |
| 30 | Joint History Office / RC Advisor | Advise RC role in Joint History Pgm | O-6 | ANG | No (ANG) |

Figure 5-1. Recommended Positions in Priority Order.

C. IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS

The success of implementing the solutions I propose can only be realized if it is part of an overall program for training National Guard Officers in joint operations on the

Joint Chiefs of Staff. First, the National Guard must develop a plan for educating its officers in Joint Professional Military Education (JPME), and then must track it. Second, the Office of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, must control the selection process and assignment of all officers on the Joint Staff. The National Guard should send officers who can represent both Army and Air Guard perspectives. Third, the selection process must identify the best officers the National Guard has. The active component sends their future leaders to the Joint Staff, and so must the National Guard.

The active component requires (by direction from Goldwater-Nichols) the officers assigned to the JCS to be highly competitive for promotion. The active component also requires that its General Officers have Joint experience. The Guard must, whenever possible, pursue these same standards to gain the same legitimacy as its active counterparts.

The National Guard members of the Joint Staff must also work together to ensure a unified effort in the joint environment. The current Guard role on the joint staff could benefit from regularly scheduled meetings. If Guard members of the joint staff could meet on a regular basis, Guard specific issues could be discussed to allow a coordinated effort throughout the joint environment. Coordinated efforts enhance the effectiveness of the Guard and create a forum for important issues to be presented to the National Guard leadership.

D. SUMMARY

An increased role on the Joint Chiefs of Staff is not only an important step to integrating the National Guard into joint operations; it is a golden opportunity. The National Guard is becoming a larger part of the Total Force and its roles and missions identified in RCE 2005 will likely increase in the future. The National Guard must be prepared to perform these new roles and missions seamlessly as part of the Total Force.

The Nation's reliance on the citizen soldier came into question with the Cold War, but it is now returning to its pre-Cold War status as an integral part of the U.S. Military. The post-Cold War world has become smaller due to technology, which has resulted in a greater reliance on joint operations. The Guard must be an effective member of the Full

Spectrum Force described in *Joint Vision 2010* and must be interoperable in the joint environment. The National Guard and Active Component leadership owes it to its soldiers to insure the National Guard is fully integrated into the modern joint environment they help comprise.

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